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Pursuing public–private partnerships (PPPs)
has become a common governance strategy in
many countries to improve public service
delivery and for large public infrastructure
projects. PPPs involve the private sector, which
is assumed to be better and more efficient at
managing infrastructure construction,
financing, maintenance and operation (for
example by the use new technologies, new
ideas or new ways of doing things). PPP contracts
are meant to incentivize private sector partners
to use their skills to produce better
infrastructure-based public services. The
academic literature on design, build, finance,
maintain and operate (DBFMO) contracts in
PPPs stresses that contracts are crucial for
success (NAO, 2002; ODPM, 2002, 2004; Pollitt,
2002; Koppenjan, 2008).
The length of the contract period and the
possibilities for imposing sanctions when
services or products do not comply with a
contract are generally thought to be especially
important. Long-term contracts enable private
partners to employ more innovative techniques
and delivery methods. Sanctions are necessary
to anticipate and respond to opportunistic
behaviour by contract partners and to improve
their performance during contract
implementation.
From the perspective of relational
contracting (Deakin and Mitchie, 1997), the
flexibility of the contract and the room it leaves
for negotiation are emphasized. Another
characteristic that is considered important is
the contract’s complexity. Drafting and
implementing complex contracts requires more
attention and higher transaction costs and
therefore may influence the performance of
partnerships (Williamson, 1996).
This paper presents a study that addressed
the following research question:
What is the influence of PPPs’ contract characteristics,
especially the length of the contract period, the
possibility of sanctions, the complexity, the possibility
for negotiation and flexibility, on the performance
and innovativeness of these partnerships?
To answer this question, we conducted a survey
of PPP projects in The Netherlands in which
we asked respondents to assess contract
characteristics and outcomes.
PPPs and contractual arrangements:
theoretical considerations
Arguments in favour of PPPs usually relate to
the terms of the contracts. Their relatively tight
character, with clear provisions for monitoring
and sanction is seen as a strength (Weihe,
2009). A long contract period allows private
parties to spread their risk and innovate. Both
of these assumptions are inspired by
(neo)economic institutional theory and by new
public management ideas (which are strongly
influenced by economic theories). Other
disciplines emphasize PPPs’ relational character
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and thus the possibilities for renegotiation and
building trust (Williamson, 1996; Deakin and
Michie, 1997; Brown et al., 2007).
PPP contract characteristics
Length of the contract period: In the literature on
DBFMO contracts, contract length is mentioned
as important because private partners need
time to recover their initial investment (see
Weihe, 2009; Hodge et al., 2010). Long contracts
may also contribute to the overall quality of the
product or service. Because these projects
integrate a number of phases, contractors are
able and incentivized to invest in better materials
in the construction phase in order to have
fewer maintenance costs later on (NAO, 2002;
ODPM, 2004). So, long contract periods can be
associated with a good overall performance:
lower costs (cost-efficiency), better quality
services and products, and more innovative
solutions and products.
The length of the contract period also
creates conditions for innovation by providing
private partners with incentives to come up
with new, innovative solutions regarding the
way they organize processes and the products
and services they provide. The extra investment
needed by these innovations will be more
affordable with long contract periods during
which there is a guaranteed cash flow (Pollitt,
2002; Koppenjan, 2005; Lenferink et al., 2013).
Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H1: A longer contract term relates positively to a
better PPP performance.
H2: A longer contract term relates positively to
innovation in PPPs.
Sanctions: Another feature of PPP contracts
highlighted in the literature is the use of
sanctions (Hodge and Greve, 2005; Van de
Velde et al., 2008). Given the possibility of
unanticipated future developments, a
government needs to have instruments to
influence the behaviour and performance of
the private partner during the contract period.
In order to do this, contracts may include the
option of applying positive and negative
sanctions during contract implementation. This
means that performance indicators and a
monitoring system need to be specified in the
contract (Williamson, 1979, 1996; Koppenjan,
2015). The core ideas about these features
come mostly from neo-institutionalist
economics. From a neo-institutionalist
perspective, the specific investments
(knowledge, money, material) made by partners
in a PPP make those partners vulnerable
(Deakin and Mitchie, 1997; Nooteboom, 2002).
Specific investments are investments in activities
or products that cannot easily be used in other
projects. This makes the investing partner
dependent on the other partner, which may
lead to opportunistic behaviour for example
taking short cuts or economizing on quality. It
is crucial, therefore, that the contractor (the
principal) is able to monitor and sanction the
contractee (the agent) if the latter fails to deliver
the promised product and the promised quality.
So the threat of sanctions are assumed to
contribute to the performance of a PPP. The
literature does not provide any clues about the
relationship between sanctions and innovation
(Pollitt, 2002; Koppenjan, 2005). We therefore
hypothesize on the influence on overall
performance only:
H3: A contract with possibilities for applying sanctions
relates positively to the PPP performance.
Complexity of the contract: The role of transaction
costs and the type of relationship are important
issues to consider in choosing the type of
contract, or, as Williamson (1979) says, the type
of governance. When transactions are not
frequent and investments are undertaken by
specific partners, there is a need either for
complex contracts that specify all possible
eventualities, or for additional governance
mechanisms (for example more investment in
contract management).
According to Williamson (1979):
Whenever investments are idiosyncratic in
nontrivial degree, increasing the degree of
uncertainty makes it more imperative that the
parties devise a machinery to ‘work things out’—
since contractual gaps will be larger and the
occasions for sequential adaptations will increase
in number and importance as the degree of
uncertainty increases.
As a solution, he proposed that:
Two possibilities exist. One would be to sacrifice
valued design features in favor of a more
standardized good or service. Market governance
would then apply. The second would be to preserve
the design but surround the transaction with an
elaborate governance apparatus, thereby
facilitating more effective adaptive, sequential
decision making.
Of course, choosing his first option would imply
renouncing the potential of added value
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(actually it implies choosing another type of
solution/product). The second option entails
additional transaction costs.
Complex projects addressed by PPPs
require specific transactions. Consequently,
more complex contracts are needed to govern
these projects or, alternatively, different forms
of governance (for example more relational
contracting). A complex contract has the
advantage of arranging many different things,
but its disadvantages include that it is costly to
draft (because a lot of information and
negotiation is needed), it is less flexible and it
will lead to high transaction costs for monitoring
and implementation. Therefore, it can be
assumed that the more complex the contract,
the less its overall effectiveness. The relationship
between complexity and innovation is less easy
to understand, with few clear ideas in the
literature. Therefore, we did not formulate an
a priori hypothesis on this relationship:
H4: Contract complexity relates negatively to the
overall performance of a PPP project.
Flexibility and renegotiation: Neo-institutionalist
theory posits that different situations may
require different forms of contracts. Other
writers on contract theory emphasize that
relational contracting is more appropriate in
complex partnerships, where innovation and
specific transactions are required, than in more
classical contracts, which have fixed
performance indicators (see Deakin and
Mitchie, 1997). Relational contracting refers to
contracts with global agreements that expect
partners to act according to the spirit of an
agreement in concrete situations that cannot
be specified in advance (Williamson, 1996;
Brown et al., 2007; De Bettignies and Ross,
2009). Several authors emphasize that,
particularly when relationships are becoming
more complex, it is essential that contracts are
flexible. ‘Flexibility’ means, for instance, that
performance specifications can be changed and
contract terms renegotiated (Verweij, 2015) to
allow for unknowable changes in conditions
during the implementation of a contract. A
rigid contract that does not allow renegotiation
may result in suboptimal outcomes, or even in
partnerships failing. Also, a rigid contract may
not allow parties to implement new ideas and
solutions (Athis and Saussier, 2007; Verweij,
2015). These considerations led us to the
following hypotheses:
H6: Contracts that are more flexible and allow room
for negotiation relate positively to the overall
performance of a PPP project.
H7: Contracts that are more flexible and allow room
for negotiation relate positively to innovation in
PPPs.
Research methodology: respondents and
variables
Our respondents were public sector officials
and project managers, and representatives of
private consortia or people in consultancy firms
involved in PPP projects. Almost all of the PPP
projects in The Netherlands (about 90) were
included in our survey.
In total, 343 people received a request to
fill in the survey questionnaire. We included as
many respondents as possible because the
average response to most surveys is about 30%.
Of the 343, 10 were not reached (mail
undeliverable), and 24 either did not want to
participate in the survey or were not involved
in the PPP project. This left 309 respondents
that were actually approached. In total, 157
people responded to the survey, 13 returned
the questionnaire without responding to any of
the questions. This left 144 people who actually
filled in at least part of the questionnaire—a
response rate of 46.6%, which is quite high.
The 144 respondents were involved in a
total of 68 PPP projects in The Netherlands.
Thus, the survey covered 73% of PPP projects
in The Netherlands. More than one
respondent from each project was included
in the dataset, therefore we needed to do a
multilevel analysis (MLA). Respondents were
employed in private consortia (27.1%),
consultancies (13.2%), public organizations
(45.8%) and other organizations (11.8%) such
as non-profit organizations and law firms.
On average, the survey respondents had
been involved in projects for 14 years; this
indicates their considerable experience with
such projects (also indicated by the average
age of 48 years). Each respondent was asked
to answer the survey questions with a specific
PPP project in mind, which they also had to
mention in the survey.
Dependent variables: project performance and project
innovativeness
Measuring the performance of complex PPP
projects is difficult. One way to operationalize
performance is to look at the extent to which
goals formulated ex ante are realized. However,
PPP projects include a variety of actors and
multiple goals. This makes it difficult (and
arbitrary) to pick one main goal to assess a
project’s performance. Furthermore, projects
take quite some time to complete, so goals will
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evolve (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016).
Additionally, we used a survey; so we did not
measure the actual outcomes of partnerships
but, rather, our respondents’ perceptions of
these outcomes. Thus, we used perceived
project performance as a proxy for outcomes.
We took this approach following earlier work
by Steijn et al. (2011), whose measurement
scales built on different dimensions of project
performance—see table 1. We found, as Steijn
et al. did, that the items formed a good scale
(as indicated by the Cronbach’s alpha, which
was over 0.7). The mean score for project
performance, as rated by the respondents,
was 4.00 (SD = 0.51) on a five-point Likert
scale, indicating a high satisfaction with the
performance of their project.
Innovativeness was measured by having
respondents rate three items—see table 2.
Cronbach’s alpha for these items was 0.78,
which is a good score. The mean score for
project innovation, as rated by the
respondents, was 6.38 (SD = 1.69) on a 10-
point Likert scale, indicating high levels of
perceived innovation within projects.
Contract characteristics
To measure the main contract characteristics,
we included four items (scored on a 1–10 scale
between two extremes) in the survey. They
were:
•Sanctions: The contract has no possibility of
imposing sanctions if the contract terms are
not met (the contract has many possibilities
for imposing sanctions if the contract terms
are not met). The mean value was 2.82
(standard deviation: 1.6).
•Complexity: The contract is simple to
understand (the contract is difficult to
understand). The mean value was 4.9
(standard deviation: 2.2).
•Flexibility: The contract is characterized by
fixed target values and norms regardless of
the circumstances (the contract is
characterized by flexible target values and
norms that can be reduced or enhanced
under certain circumstances). The mean
value was 4.9 (standard deviation: 2.4).
•Negotiation: The contract offers very little
space for renegotiation (the contract offers
much space for renegotiation). The mean
value was 4.95 (standard deviation: 2.2).
We also measured the length of the contract by
asking the following question: ‘What is the
length of the contract (in number of years)?’
The mean of this variable was 19.9 years and
the standard deviation nine years.
Control variables
As control variables, we used the size of the
network around the PPP project (coded in five
Table 1. Measurement of perceived project performance.
Dimension (Cronbach alpha: 0.71) Term Item (five-point scale)
1.Integral nature of solution INT Different environmental functions have been connected
sufficiently
2.Effectiveness of solution EFF Solutions developed really deal with the problems at hand
3 Effectiveness in the future FUT Developed solutions are durable for the future
4.Support for solution SUP The project solutions are sufficiently supported by the
organizations involved
5.Relationships costs and benefits RCB In general, the benefits exceed the costs
Table 2. Measurement of perceived project innovation.
Dimension (Cronbach alpha: 0.78) Term Item (10-point scale between two extremes)
1.Innovative solutions INN Compared to other projects, no innovative solutions have
been developed in this project
Compared to other projects, a lot of innovative solutions have
been developed in this project
2.New technology TEC In this project, no new technology has been developed or
used
In this project, a lot of new technology has been developed or
used
3.Expectation innovative character EXP The innovative character of this project is far below my initial
expectations
The innovative character of this project is far beyond my
initial expectations
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categories: 0–4, 5–9, 10–14, 15–19, 20+
organizations) and the respondents’
organizational background. The last variable
was coded in three categories: public
organization, private organization, and
consultancy firm.
Common method bias
Measuring both independent and dependent
variables from the perceptions of the same
survey respondents entails the risk of common
method bias. There are several tests to examine
whether common method bias is a problem.
The best known is the Harman one-factor test.
The Harman test assesses whether one single
factor explains the correlations in the data. For
that, an unrotated factor analysis had to be
performed with the items. We did this, and no
single factor emerged. (Actually, we performed
two separate factor analyses with the two
dependent variables. The first factor explained
28% or 29% of the variance. If we put all the
variables in a factor analysis, the first factor
explained only 26% of the variance.)
Another test advocated by various
researchers is the Lindell and Whitney (2001)
test. This test uses a theoretically-unrelated
construct as a marker variable to check for
common method bias. Any high correlation of
the marker variable with any of the other
variables is an indicator of common method
bias. We used another survey variable, not
used in this study, as a marker (the extent to
which parties have worked together before).
Table 3 shows the correlation coefficients and
R2 between variables in the model and the
marker. The correlations were low (maximum
R2 = 0.034)—this suggests that common method
bias was not a problem in our survey data.
Data analysis: MLA
We carried out an MLA as the observations in
the dataset were not fully independent (Hox,
2002). Using multilevel regression analysis
makes sense only if there is a sufficient variation
in the dependent variable at the project level.
In our analysis of perceived performance, for
instance, according to the baseline (null) model,
about 42.6% of the variation in perceived project
performance could be explained by project-
relevant characteristics—individual-level
variance = 0.1549; project-level variance =
0.1152. In the case of perceived project
innovativeness, 47.8% of the variation could be
explained by project-relevant characteristics.
Given the high percentage, combined with
significant -2ll values, it was clear that single-
level regression analysis was not going to be
suitable.
Contract characteristics and their impact on
PPP performance
Our data consisted of projects that were officially
recognized by the Dutch government as PPP
projects. Most of the PPP projects in the survey
were managed through a contract (92%).
To examine the relations between the
variables, we first performed a simple
correlation between the variables of the
conceptual model. The results are shown in
table 4. The first observation was that there
were few significant correlations. There was a
negative significant correlation between length
of contract and innovativeness (contrary to
H1); a negative relationship between the
possibility of sanctions and performance
Table 3. Correlation and R2 between variables and marker.
Variables in the model Pearson coefficient R2
1 Performance -0.007 0.000
2 Project innovativeness 0.185 0.034
3 Length of contract -0.044 0.002
4 Possibility of sanctions 0.009 0.000
5 Complexity of contract 0.091 0.008
6 Flexibility of contract 0. 006 0.004
7 Possibility of negotiation 0.001 0.000
8 Organizational background 0.118 0.014
9 Size of network 0.134 0.002
Table 4. Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Performance 1
2 Project innovativeness 0.405** 1
3 Length of contract 0.072 -0.226* 1
4 Possibility of sanctions -0.218* -0.060 -0.325** 1
5 Complexity of contract -0.244* -0.317** 0.190 0.215* 1
6 Flexibility of contract 0.083 -0.097 -0.127 0.227* 0.172 1
7 Possibility of negotiation 0.131 0.141 -0.269** 0.108 -0.003 0.223* 1
8 Organizational background 0.078 0.174 0.159 -0.169 -067 -0.036 -0.029 1
9 Size of network 0.112 0.006 0.091 -0.143 -0.077 -0.186 -0.068 0.030 1
Notes: **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
N is between 100 and 144 (pairwise deletion of missing values).
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(contrary to H3); and a negative relation
between complexity of contract and both
performance and innovativeness (in line with
H4). Flexibility and the possibility of negotiation
did not significantly affect performance or
innovativeness. What is interesting is that the
length of contracts was mostly negatively related
to the other contract characteristics. So longer
contracts were thought to be less flexible and to
have fewer possibilities for negotiation
possibilities.
Contract characteristics and (perceived) partnership
performance and innovativeness
To examine the effects of contract
characteristics, we performed two multilevel
regression analyses: one with perceived
performance as dependent variable and one
with innovativeness as dependent variable. In
both cases, we used the same independent
variables: the five contract characteristics and
the two control variables. The results are shown
in table 5.
As table 5 shows, some contract
characteristics had a negative effect on project
performance and innovativeness. The
possibility of sanctions and complexity both
had a negative impact on performance and
innovativeness; length of contract had a negative
impact on innovativeness. Flexibility and the
possibility of negotiation both had a positive
effect on performance and innovativeness.
However, none of the contract
characteristics were significant when we
performed a multilevel analysis, with the
exception of the possibility of sanctions, which
had a significant negative impact on
performance.
This means that no relation can be found
between contract characteristics and
performance and innovativeness, except that
sanctions have a negative effect on performance
(contrary to our expectation in H3 that sanctions
would have a positive effect).
Conclusions: contract characteristics are
not the key
In this paper, we looked at the effects of the
complexity of PPP contracts, the possibility
of negotiation, the possibility of sanctions,
flexibility, and the length of the contract on
performance. Only the possibility of imposing
sanctions was thought to have any impact
(negative) on PPP performance. Our findings
therefore cast some doubt on earlier research
emphasizing the importance of contract
characteristics for project performance. Our
findings suggest that we need to look
elsewhere to find explanations for PPP
performance.
Limitations of our study
Of course, our study has its limitations. In the
first place, we looked at respondents’
perceptions. We also had only one item to
measure the various contract characteristics
(although we used a 10-point scale between
two extremes). Furthermore, we selected only
people who were actively involved in PPP
projects and who thus were knowledgeable
about those projects. As self-reported data on
performance can have some drawbacks, we
chose to explicitly indicate this by using the
term ‘perceived project performance’.
Second, as the same respondents provided
the information for both the independent and
the dependent variables, inflated relationships
between variables could have occurred.
Fortunately, our tests indicated that common
method bias as a consequence of self-reported
data was not of great concern in this study, and
that it is unlikely to confound the interpretation
of results.
Third, as not all the respondents that we
approached actually filled in the survey, for
some (mostly larger) projects, more respondents
reacted than for other projects. For this reason,
we conducted multilevel tests, where applicable,
to deal with the multi-level nature of our data.
For about half of our projects, however, we had
Table 5. Multilevel regression model for perceived project
performance and perceived project innovativeness.
Model 1: perceived Model 2: perceived




Length of contract 0.0059 NS -0.016 NS
Possibility of sanctions -0.051** -0108 NS
Complexity -0.0398 NS -0.129 NS
Flexibility 0.0105 NS 0.005 NS
Possibility of negotiation 0.038 NS 0.078 NS
Organizational background -0.012 NS 0.263 NS
Size of network 0.041 NS 0.009 NS
Random part
Level 1. Individuals
(residual variance) 0.139 NS 1.672 NS
Level 2. Projects
(intercept variance) 0.085 NS 0.807 NS
Note: Entries are the results of multilevel analysis, with perceived project performance
as dependent variable.
*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the
0.05 level (two-tailed). NS = not significant. Bootstrapping performed with 1000
samples.
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only one respondent per project who filled in
the survey, whereas at least two respondents
would have been better for aggregation of the
results to the project level.
Despite the limitations, our findings are
important because the literature on PPP—both
the theoretical literature inspired by
institutional economics and new public
management ideas and the ‘grey’ literature
from public organizations, consultancy agencies
and audit organizations—emphasize the
importance of contracts for PPP performance.
So these findings certainly need some reflection.
Are contracts important or not?
First of all, our findings are perhaps less
surprising than they seem at first glance. They
are consistent with earlier surveys that did not
find any significant relation between
organizational characteristics of institutional
PPPs (such as the form of special purpose
organizations, their arm’s-length positions vis-
à-vis principals and so on) and PPP performance
(see Kort and Klijn, 2011; Steijn et al., 2011).
These findings indicate that the influence of
formal contracts and organizational
arrangements on PPP performance seems to
be overrated. Other factors may be important,
perhaps even more important, like the
managerial effort that is put into the PPP (see
Steijn et al., 2011). There are also several authors
who have criticized the basic assumptions
behind the contractual PPP idea and questioned
whether tight contracts can provide better and
more efficient services (see Shaoul, 2005).
Of course contract characteristics do not
have a direct influence on performance: they
simply provide the possibility of renegotiation
etc. Several earlier papers stress that it is
managerial effort in partnerships that make
the difference in performance (see Steijn et al.,
2011; Kort and Klijn, 2011).
Another explanation could be that
partnerships are more complex than the
literature and the debate on DBFMO suggest
(Klijn et al., 2008). A complex network of
actors is involved in a PPP and their
relationships are not all regulated by the
contract. The network of actors involved in a
private consortium, for example, is very
complicated and diverse (builders, banks,
consultants and operators) and it may well be
that, despite having an integrated DBFMO
contract, the reality behind the scenes of this
consortium is highly fragmented, with
relationships being arranged and governed in
traditional ways.
So, do our findings imply that contract
characteristics are of no importance in the
performance of PPP projects? We think the
case is more complicated than this.
Good contracts and other organizational
features have relevance for PPP projects, despite
our not finding any direct and strong correlation
with outcomes. However, their influence may
be revealed only in interaction with other
factors. What is clear, though, is that they
cannot guarantee good performance and
innovation. Contracts are probably a necessary,
or at least an important condition, but they are
not an iron-clad guarantee of success. A wider
range of factors are at work in the complex
networks that make up PPPs. Further research
is needed to improve our understanding of the
relative importance of these factors and how
they interact. For now, also on the basis of
earlier research, we hypothesize that, in
particular, agency factors like the quality of
interaction, managerial activities and trust
between the partners make partnerships work
(see also Kort et al., forthcoming). Our findings
are a warning to anyone who thinks that the
performance of PPPs can be steered by contracts
alone. They are probably not even the most
important factor.
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IMPACT
In the discussion about public–private partnerships (PPPs), and especially the design, build,
finance, maintain and operate (DBFMO) form, the contract is considered vitally important.
Five characteristics of typical PPP contracts are widely assumed to have a positive effect on
outcome: length; the possibility of sanctions; flexibility; complexity; and the option to
renegotiate. However, this study, which looked at three-quarters of the PPPs in The
Netherlands, found that this is not necessarily the case—we need to look elsewhere to find
explanations for PPP performance. Practitioners should not overestimate the role of
contract characteristics in PPP performance. Contracts may ensure a certain stability but
cannot solve the complexity of PPP projects and the need to build trust between partners
and to invest in project management and relationship building.
